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ABSTRACT 
Creating, building, managing a cost effective digital forensics lab including a team of qualified 
examiners can be a challenge for colleges [1] with multiple campuses in multiple towns, counties and 
states.  Leaving such examination responsibilities to each of the campuses results in not only disparity 
in the results but more than likely excessive duplication of efforts as well as the potential for 
compromise of evidence.  Centralizing the forensic efforts results in a team that is not subject to the 
political pressures of a campus and virtually eliminates the possibility of examiner favoritism.  Learn 
what it takes to create a cost effective centralized digital forensics lab.  It sounds simple but is truly 
quite complex when you consider the chain-of-custody issue as well as the management support 
needed during initial implementation.  There will be resistance at some of the campuses while others 
will welcome the removal of a burden.  We will also examine why such a lab is necessary and what 
can be learned about compliance to existing policy as well as the possibility of identifying the need for 
additional policy/standards.  
Keywords:  digital forensics investigation malware criminal chain-of-custody centralized lab  
1. THE CHALLENGE 
Implementing centralized digital forensics investigation within a widespread enterprise can be 
difficult.  There are numerous fiefdoms involved, many of which hold self-serving interests which are 
contrary to such a project.  No matter how much sense it may make it is not uncommon to meet 
massive resistance.  The initial acceptance of the concept will often be the greatest challenge its 
advocate will ever face! 
Knowing your organization including the individuals involved in blocking or supporting such a project 
is usually necessary in the collegiate environment.  After all, commonly each campus is quite 
independent from central management whose role is primarily that of obtaining funding and setting 
budgets with some over site relative to more sensitive issues which certainly vary from college to 
college and private versus the public sector.  Some intelligence gathering is often essential to achieve 
success. 
Do not jump in whole hog without knowing the terrain.  Plan….plan….plan…. 
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2. JUSTIFYING THE PROJECT 
Your greatest challenge is the justification.  The balance of effort will be a piece of cake in comparison 
but quite tedious at times.  Care must be taken to ensure clarity and understandability.  Often the 
justification will be read by those who are unfamiliar with information technology and especially the 
whole concept of digital forensics.  To many digital forensics is just another term and very possibly is 
simply an adaptation of the term forensics which has become so popular today in the field of law 
enforcement.  Many cannot relate that forensics in science and information technology is an analysis 
technique which ensures that should illegal activity, whatever that might be, be found that the 
evidence is preserved in a manner consistent with that which is acceptable to law enforcement and the 
courts. 
More than likely very few if any digital forensic investigations regarding malware infestations will 
uncover criminal activity.  However, it is entirely possible and you must be prepared.  How 
embarrassing would it be to the college if a staff or faculty member was detected with sums of child 
pornography on the system including trading/sale of same but could not be prosecuted due to 
inadmissible evidence?  Take it a step further and envision that identifying that staff member to law 
enforcement results in a determination that the staff member is also a child molester yet could not be 
prosecuted due to the principle of “fruit of the poisonous tree” [2].  Surely, this something everyone at 
every level wishes to avoid. 
Preservation of evidence is not the only justification.  The remainder relates to traditional management 
concepts/needs.  
2.1 Control 
In order to ensure that the evidence (the malware infected device; specifically, the hard drive in the 
case of an infected computer) is preserved in a manner satisfactory to law enforcement, etcetera it is 
imperative that effective control is maintained throughout the process commonly referred to as the 
“chain of custody” [3]. 
This requires the creation of detailed records of the handling and storage of a physical drive from the 
time it is taken into possession by the information technology staff through and until the drive is 
successfully and properly forensically imaged.  In an ideal world the physical drive would be 
preserved until it is established that there is not a criminal concern.  However, in reality this is not 
practical in most environments.  The number of duplicate drives at each site likely would be excessive. 
While efficient, this centralized process does tie up each drive for several days even with the creation 
of a forensic image archive.  There is the transportation in both directions as well as the time in the 
forensic lab.  Unless generously configured there will be times when a drive sits for two to three days 
at the forensic lab until it has been successfully archived.  As a result the average amount of time a 
drive to be investigated is out of service is likely five business days.  Also, the drive will remain 
unusable for another day or so until it is wiped and reimaged.  Thus, it is impractical to leave the 
impacted user without a computer.  Therefore each campus will need to keep a sum of drives on hand 
and ready to go when infections occur. 
In addition there is the issue of control while in the forensics lab.  As will be seen later, there are 
additional control benefits in the decentralized lab. 
2.2 Savings 
The question to be answered is whether the work which needs to be done is being accomplished and, if 
so is it complying with all of the issues relative to evidence preservation?   If no, an analysis is 
required to determine why and identify the savings that can be realized through centralization.  If yes, 
then the issue is a comparison of costs between the current processes versus that of centralization. 
More than likely if you are considering a centralized digital forensics lab either the current process is 
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not effective or does not exist but there should be a perceived need.  Need takes many forms, constant 
reinfection being one of them along with compromise of PII [4] or PCI DSS [5] information as well as 
other information under development which should not be disclosed until ready; in other words 
competitive information which also exists in the collegiate world, especially within the private sector. 
2.2.1 Constant Reinfection 
The primary cause of constant reinfection is the failure of a specific campus that does not follow 
proper procedures when an infection occurs.  With a centralized digital forensic lab such failures 
become readily apparent and corrective actions can be initiated. 
2.2.2 PII Compromise 
When PII is compromised the rules/regulations/laws vary from jurisdiction in addition to the ethical 
obligations.  Hopefully your college already has a published policy regarding compromised PII.  When 
compromised PII is detected by a centralized digital forensic lab you are assured that the resulting 
actions meet current requirements.  The embarrassment that might occur should non-compliance be 
discovered and reported by the media could result in incalculable damage. 
2.2.3 PCI DSS Compromise 
Failure to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard [5] likely will result in 
unfavorable media coverage as well as the real potential for the loss of rights to process payment cards 
on campus in a convenient manner. 
2.2.4 Compromise of Competitive Information 
Development of new majors/minors and other strategies including the development of new for fee 
services are commonly business confidential until they are made public. 
2.3 Staffing 
The initial staffing size is difficult to calculate but certainly should be far less than when such 
examinations are conducted at each campus.  Staffing size is also dependent upon the working model.  
Experience indicates that the decentralized lab requires a smaller staff in addition to offering other 
advantages and efficiencies.  In a typical environment, when a thorough examination is conducted of 
each case to include production of a written report that can be read and understood at the campus by 
non-information technology professionals, the average time per case is two hours. 
2.4 Influence, Bias, etcetera 
In a centralized model the examiners are sheltered from all forms of overt influence and bias as well as 
friendships.  It is quite common in a collegiate environment to “protect their own”, especially when 
the unknown or misunderstood is encountered.  All too often senior staff and faculty become 
concerned that the case may impact their career, especially when they are unaware of peers 
encountering similar problems.  Dealing with the matter centrally and properly managing the entire 
process can and should eliminate this concern. 
 
3. CREATING, BUILDING AND MANAGING A COST EFFECTIVE DIGITAL FORENSICS 
LAB 
This is not a seat-of-the-pants project.  Careful planning will result in successful implementation with 
little or no disruption to existing operations.  Key to this process is choosing the appropriate model and 
while there are perceived advantages to both, the decentralized model offers greater flexibility and 
opportunity. 
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3.1 Models 
3.1.1 Traditional Lab 
The traditional lab is totally centralized and frequently is completely isolated from all other 
information technology activities.  This represents a great deal of cost which can be minimized in the 
decentralized model.  Typically, in the traditional lab the forensic examiners are solely responsible for 
all activities from creating the archives to mounting the drives to be examined on their dedicated 
forensic examination work station.  Commonly, the examiner works from the console of the work 
station. 
There are variations, many of which will be described in the decentralized lab.  However, most of the 
initial costs of the traditional lab cannot be avoided. 
3.1.2 Decentralized Lab 
The concept of a decentralized lab is foreign to many yet much of its structure is similar to the 
traditional lab and many of its features can be implemented in the traditional lab. 
Basic Concept:  Compartmentalize the many responsibilities of the digital forensics lab thus ensuring 
a higher level of confidence and trust in its integrity while allowing some of the activities to be 
performed “remotely”. 
Forensic computers:  Locate in a truly secure data center, preferably not located on the campus of 
any of the colleges.  Day to day support of the forensic computers is performed by operations staff to 
the extent necessary to mount and dismount cases being examined. 
Examination/Archive copies:  Examination and archive copy functions are commonly created by the 
same operations staff which supports the forensic computers.  Thus, once a drive to be examined 
arrives on site only operations staff trusted to support forensics ever handles the original physical drive 
as well as all copies. 
Forensic Examiners:  Examiners access their assigned forensic computer remotely even when they 
are physically based on site.  Thus, examiners can be located anywhere they are able to connect 
securely into the forensic network.  Thus, should there be qualified forensic examiners on one or more 
of the campuses they can be reassigned to the new forensic team.  In addition, in today’s world of 
digital mobility a valued team member can be retained should it be necessary for that team member to 
not live in the region. 
Forensic Network:  The forensic network must be carefully architected to be isolated from the 
balance of the college network and access to that rigidly managed and monitored as well as restricted 
to forensic staff only!  Logical maintenance of the forensic computers is the responsibility of the 
assigned examiner.  Physical maintenance is the responsibility of forensic trusted operations staff. 
3.2 Building the Lab 
The cost of building such a lab can often be minimized if the college’s network architecture already 
has a centralized data center providing common services to all of the campuses.  For those without this 
option must consider whether to co-locate on an existing campus or completely off-site.  Costs can be 
minimized with co-location providing that the forensic staff work environment is isolated from the 
general campus environment.  Failure to do so compromises many of the benefits of a centralized 
digital forensics lab. 
3.2.1 Hardware 
Hardware must be robust but not necessarily state-of-the-art.  Forensic tools have not been that quick 
to jump to the latest hardware architecture and likely will not abandon support for earlier platforms 
which support XP.  There may be some concerns regarding XP relative to Internet access yet since 
such actual access should only be performed in a virtual mode that is not likely to be a near term issue. 
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Clearly, XP platforms being replaced with Win7 etcetera can be utilized in the lab.  Components of the 
platform will require replacement for best performance as well as maximizing memory and external 
ports.  Also, some hardware write blocks, at least one per forensic computer will be needed.  As hard 
drives keep growing in size it may be appropriate to examine the case drive directly and based on the 
result determine whether an archive image copy is needed. 
3.2.2 Software 
There are numerous software tools available.  While there are other examination tools, serious 
consideration should be given to choosing Encase [6].  It does require some training/experience to be 
effective with Encase, but in the end it is the tool which is trusted in law enforcement circles should 
they become involved.  Beyond Encase, a trusted VM tool is needed as well as several other tools 
which should be considered: 
• Automated registry decoder; e.g., Registry Ripper [7] 
• View the Registry in native mode; e.g., Registry Viewer [8] 
• Tool to locate and identify PII/PCI DSS data; e.g., Identity Finder [9] 
• Tool to evaluate links; e.g., Link Examiner [10] 
• Linux-like environment for Windows making it possible to port software running on 
POSIX systems (such as Linux, BSD, and Unix systems) to Windows; e.g., Cygwin [11] 
• Possibly a network meeting tool; e.g., TeamViewer [12] 
• VM tool; there are many to choose from. 
• Sandbox Tool; e.g., Sandboxie [13] 
• Key Recovery; e.g., Recover Keys [14] 
3.2.3 Staffing 
All members of the forensic team must be chosen for their skills, experience and trustworthiness.  
Fortunately it is very likely that you will be able to identify within your current professional staff.  If 
not, perhaps within faculty.  In today’s job market it is possible you can locate key staff locally at 
reasonable cost.  Choose your staff carefully as their duties require not only competency and loyalty 
but also trustworthiness. 
4. LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES/ADVANTAGES 
Unlike having forensic examiners at each campus, operating a centralized digital forensics lab will 
provide benefits difficult to achieve without one. 
4.1 Image Maintenance 
Hopefully there are image [15] standards in place.  Due to the challenge of distribution and installation 
from a centralized facility most colleges provide imaging standards on each campus.  Ideally, there are 
standards set centrally which describe image content, frequency of refresh, etcetera. 
Forensic examinations can readily identify where those standards are not being maintained and thus 
corrective action can be initiated. 
4.2 Consistent Practices 
One of the challenges of managing multiple locations is that of consistency.  In addition, it is not that 
uncommon to come across practices at one location which are an improvement over that which is 
practiced at other sites.  Whether the result is that of bringing all sites into alignment or learning what 
is better than a current practice, it is nothing but distinct value. 
Another concern is that of inconsistency; for example, a situation develops that results in 
management/clients/media noting a problem that could have been avoided had it followed a practice at 
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site D, and why aren’t sites B, C and E also following site D’s model? 
4.3 Building Trust/Confidence with the Campuses IT [16] Security Staff 
While it is not uncommon for the IT Security teams at each campus to be initially wary when a 
centralized digital forensic facility is created, when done carefully it will result in a trust relationship 
which otherwise might not have been built.  Over time it is more than likely that a query will be 
received from an IT Security staff member or manager regarding a specific incident.  When clear 
concise explanations are offered while avoiding the implication of blame, trust develops; especially 
when it is possible to point out how such situations can be avoided in the future. 
5. SUMMARY 
Selling the concept of a centralized digital forensics facility/lab in the collegiate environment can be 
challenging.  The basic premise of campus independence/autonomy will always be an issue.  
However, the fact of the matter is that there is much to be gained and learned through centralizing 
digital forensics as well as a potential significant cost savings. 
No two colleges or campuses are identical.  For campuses, location in terms of distance from the 
college is a large consideration/influence.  None-the-less, a serious examination of the potential 
benefits of a centralized digital forensics lab should be performed. 
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APPENDIX – SAMPLE FORENSICS EXAMINATION OPERATION 
AUTHOR 
Robert E. Johnston, CISSP, November 1, 2010, eMail:  bjohnston@e-computer-security.com 
OVERVIEW 
This paper was prepared for a professional discussion group that wanted a basic explanation of a 
forensics lab.  Since the group consisted of virtually all private sector business security professionals 
you will find that it avoids reference to the collegiate environment and I tried my best to make it 
usable in the private sector.  Common abbreviations are not explained and abbreviations created for 
convenience in the paper are “explained” the first time they occur.  In addition, you will find for your 
convenience a complete list of abbreviations at the end of this document. 
INTRODUCTION 
Forensics Labs can take many forms.  The reason for preparing this model is that it was requested by 
someone who wanted “model procedures” to which I responded that there is not truly a model that is 
uniform to all situations.  I believe that the following dissertation will make that abundantly clear yet 
possibly assist him in his assignment/endeavor.  
This is based on an existing “successful” lab supporting an enterprise consisting of 12 remote 
locations and a central office, all within a single state.  Some of the practices contained herein clearly 
will not work due to physical distances elsewhere.  Understand that the distance from the central office 
to any remote site does not exceed 60 miles with the majority within 30 miles.    On the other hand, 
why does the lab exist? 
After all, there are commercial labs committed to the recovery of information; criminal labs intended 
to identify illegal activity as well as many others including the enterprise which focuses upon network 
compromise including PII, PCI and HIPAA issues.  The lab to be illustrated is concerned with network 
compromise, PII and to a limited extent PCI matters.  At the same time such labs cannot ignore the 
possibility of the discovery of illegal activity whether fraud, extortion, child pornography or other 
criminal activity.  While an enterprise might consider such possibility to be infinitesimally small, the 
possibility should not be ignored! 
Once one starts examining a hard drive, it is amazing what might be discovered.  It truly ranges from 
criminal activity to massive waste of resources and time as well as proper usage of enterprise 
resources.  While, for the most part the discovery of such activity not in the best interest of the 
enterprise must be concluded on an individual basis, that option does not exist for some activity that 
must be reported to law enforcement as the result of legislation.  Thus, it is incumbent upon every 
forensic activity to ensure that the “chain of custody” is maintained lest damage to the image of the 
enterprise and/or violation of law occur when such activity is revealed but cannot be prosecuted and 
possibly the offender cannot be reprimanded under corporate guidelines. 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
When an event occurs at a Remote Office (RO) a notice is sent to the Central Office (CO) advising of 
the issue and requesting advice as to the necessity of a forensic examination.  A prompt reply is 
provided confirming the need or offering technical advice when one is not needed. 
Systems to be forensically examined have their drive(s) removed by authorized IT personnel at the RO 
and a record kept of that individual as well as the reason for submission and details regarding the 
drive’s identity on the RO Control Sheet (CS).  The drive(s) is/are transported to the CO by one of 
several authorized individuals and their identity is recorded along with the date and time on their CS.  
The CO CS will record all drive handling from imaging through to return.  The forensic examiners 
(FEs) never touch the original drive, imaged drive or the archived version.  
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THE FORENSIC LAB 
Forensic labs are designed in many forms while, hopefully, meeting the objectives of management and 
excellent business practices.  All sorts of issues must be taken into consideration including available 
resources (space, staff, objectives and etcetera).  Many labs are the actual work space of the 
examiners.  Others adopt a more flexible environment by placing the lab in the data center 
environment where the operations staff supports the forensic computers and the examiners connect to 
them remotely, never having physical contact with the hardware. 
Having operations perform all of the drive handling issues ensures knowing where the responsibility 
lies as well as having the FEs totally focused upon their responsibilities of case examination and 
reporting.   
There clearly are advantages to both, but when all is said and done, procedurally many find the latter 
arrangement to be the most advantageous.  Once the drive is imaged and archived the image drive is 
mounted on a forensic computer and the responsible FE notified; all of which is documented on the 
CO CS. 
THE EXAMINATION 
FE activity commences with the creation of a virtual drive for a malware scan for all cases.  However, 
before the malware scan may be started specific “history files” must be created so that the result of the 
malware scan and further activity can be properly documented.  Using a naming standard created for 
the forensic examinations all of the preliminary work of creating the temporary storage directory 
(TSD) and propagating much of the content including copies of all quarantined items, an extract of 
each of the major components of the registry and a boiler plate copy of the FE’s report (FER) to be 
populated as the FE continues through to completion is created by a custom program created for this 
activity.  The FE then initiates the rescan directing the result be stored in a sub-directory of the TSD. 
Then, a copy of the RO notice is created in the TSD and a summary of its content entered into the 
FER.  Dependent upon the reason for examination the FE proceeds to review the many resources 
captured in the TSD while the malware scan continues to completion.  Once completed any malware 
infestations detected will be documented in the FER.  When necessary, commonly for every 
examination, the drive will be opened with a forensic examination tool and the details of the content of 
the drive will be examined for the specifics needed to document and close the case. 
When completed the FE will submit the FER to management for final disposition.  From the FE’s 
perspective the case is closed and all documentation is noted as closed including entries in the CS of 
the RO and CO.  Drive final disposition is also documented in the CS and the content of the TSD is 
transferred to the permanent history file. 
Other summary reports are created on a monthly basis from the FERs for use by management in 
understanding just what is being examined and understanding the issues which might warrant further 
action to preclude repetition. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
CO – Central Office 
CS – Control Sheet  
FE – forensic examiners 
FER – forensic examiner’s report 
RO – Remote Office 
TSD – temporary storage directory 
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